Examples

E000001 Diba Facebook Expedition

Summary: 2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message).


E000002 Narrative examples

Summary: Midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside.


E000003 MH17 competing narratives

Summary: "Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community" (deny); "The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate" (dismiss).


E000004 Master narratives promoted by major powers

Summary: "Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks"


E000005 Master narratives promoted by major powers

Summary: Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers


E000006 Master narratives promoted by major powers

Summary: USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism


E000007 Paying for access to existing accounts

Summary: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages.


E000008 Avaaz-reported pages and groups

Summary: EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe.


E000009 Fakes listed in the US Mueller report

Summary: Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami.


E000010 Denver Guardian

Summary: A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton.


E000011 Jade Helm fake experts

Summary: For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn.


E000012 White House explosions

Summary: Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.


E000013 Ten_GOP

Summary: 2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel.


E000014 VaccinateUS gofundme

Summary: 2016: #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months).


E000015 ColumbianChemicals hashtag

Summary: #ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana.


E000016 Pope endorses Trump

Summary: 2016: “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.”


E000017 FBI director rumours

Summary: 2016: "FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”.


E000018 Qanon conspiracy

Summary: Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable "


E000019 Slowed-down Pelosi video

Summary: Pelosi video (making her appear drunk)


E000020 Shark on streets

Summary: Photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.


E000021 Sekondary Infektion

Summary: 2019: DFRLab report "Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election.


E000022 FCC comments

Summary: Flooding FCC with comments


E000023 fake engagement metrics

Summary: Creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue.


E000024 Canadians arrested for spying

Summary: (2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO).


E000025 Rumour about syrian rebels gassing their own people

Summary: (2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government.


E000026 Singapore act

Summary: 2019 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility."


E000027 Social media cut off in Kashmir

Summary: India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.


E000028 Rappler

Summary: Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place.


E000029 ProPublica

Summary: 2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.


E000030 Saudi bots

Summary: 2018: bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.


E000031 50 Cent army

Summary: popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall")


E000032 Positive images of China

Summary: technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China.


E000033 FCC comments

Summary: 2017: the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)


E000034 Tertiary sites

Summary: Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca.


E000035 Star News Digital Media

Summary: 2019, US Domestic news: Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism.


E000036 Iranian sites including Liberty Front Press

Summary: (2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms.


E000037 Issues that can be politicised

Summary: BlackLivesMatter, MeToo


E000038 TrudeauMustGo

Summary: 2019: #TrudeauMustGo


E000039 PhosphorusDisaster hashtag

Summary: #PhosphorusDisaster


E000040 RT/Sputnik

Summary: RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.


E000041 IRA organising US political rallies

Summary: (Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election


E000042 Facebook groups coordinating public space activities

Summary: Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space.


E000043 China messaging on Taiwan and Hong Kong

Summary: China constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China.


E000044 Snopes

Summary: Snopes is best-known example of fact-checking sites.


E000045 2018 EU regulations

Summary: In 2018, the European Union created significant new regulations on the role of social media in media


E000046 German social media content regulations

Summary: German model: facebook forced to police content by law


E000047 Buzzfeed rumour list

Summary: Buzzfeed real-time disaster rumour list


E000048 FEMA rumour list

Summary: FEMA real-time disaster rumour list


E000049 counter narrative handbook

Summary: Handbook at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf


E000050 Reality Team

Summary: Realityteam.org


E000051 USAID programs

Summary: USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations. Note that USAID operations were at a different level.


E000052 kPop hashtag flooding

Summary: kPop stans flooding extremist hashtags with pop videos and images.


E000053 2018 DDOS of troll farms

Summary: midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms


E000054 Learn to Discern

Summary: The "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.”


E000055 Baltic Center for Media Excellence

Summary: NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.”


E000056 Reality Team ground truthing

Summary: RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.


E000057 Reddit channels flooded with jokes

Summary: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes.


E000058 kPop hashtag flooding

Summary:


E000059 LGBT flooding of #proudboys

Summary:


E000060 Pro-Truth Pledge

Summary: community code of conduct


E000061 The Commons Project

Summary: The Commons Project from BuildUp.


E000062 US Forces in Latvia

Summary: In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.”


E000063 Current Time videos

Summary: Using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017).


E000064 Bedep Trojan

Summary: (2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia


E000065 2014 Russian poll in France

Summary: August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015).


E000066 Latvian newsrooms

Summary: Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”


E000067 Using Adwords to redirect ISIS content readers

Summary: Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Can apply this method to Russian propaganda.


E000068 India

Summary: Indian influencers and aunties countering misinformation.


E000069 Macron election in France

Summary: Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak.


E000070 Saudi tit for tat campaign

Summary:


E000071 Baltic Elves

Summary: Baltic Elves. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/


E000072 Taiwan humor over rumor

Summary: Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news and https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation