M013: targeting
Summary: Target the components of a disinformation campaign
| Counters in M013 | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| C00036 | Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) | All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration. |
| C00046 | Marginalise and discredit extremist groups | Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation. |
| C00052 | Infiltrate platforms | Detect and degrade |
| C00060 | Legal action against for-profit engagement factories | Take legal action against for-profit "factories" creating misinformation. |
| C00067 | Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) | Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. |
| C00077 | Active defence: run TA15 "develop people” - not recommended | Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators |
| C00143 | (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time | Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. |
| C00153 | Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure | Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate. |
| C00162 | Unravel/target the Potemkin villages | Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year. |
| C00164 | compatriot policy | protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors |
| C00207 | Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended | |