TA09 "Deliver Content"
Belongs to phase P03 Execute
Summary: Release content to general public or larger population
| TA09 Tasks | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| TK0021 | deamplification (suppression, censoring) | deamplification (suppression, censoring) |
| TK0022 | amplification | amplification |
| TK0039 | OPSEC for TA09 | OPSEC for TA09 |
| TA09 Techniques | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| T0114 | Deliver Ads | Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising. |
| T0114.001 | Social media | Social Media |
| T0114.002 | Traditional Media | Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards |
| T0115 | Post Content | Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). |
| T0115.001 | Share Memes | Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns. |
| T0115.002 | Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash | Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash. |
| T0115.003 | One-Way Direct Posting | Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. |
| T0116 | Comment or Reply on Content | Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). |
| T0116.001 | Post inauthentic social media comment | Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums. |
| T0117 | Attract Traditional Media | Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media). |
| TA09 Counters | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| C00109 | Dampen Emotional Reaction | Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. |
| C00122 | Content moderation | Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. |
| C00123 | Remove or rate limit botnets | reduce the visibility of known botnets online. |
| C00124 | Don't feed the trolls | Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. |
| C00125 | Prebunking | Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. |
| C00126 | Social media amber alert | Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents |
| C00128 | Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants" | Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. |
| C00129 | Use banking to cut off access | fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism |
| C00147 | Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days) | Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts. |
| C00182 | Redirection / malware detection/ remediation | Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. |
| C00200 | Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo | FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. |
| C00211 | Use humorous counter-narratives | |
| TA09 Detections | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| F00051 | Challenge expertise | |
| F00052 | Discover sponsors | Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful. |
| F00053 | Government rumour control office (what can we learn?) | |
| F00054 | Restrict people who can @ you on social networks | |
| F00055 | Verify credentials | |
| F00056 | Verify organisation legitimacy | |
| F00057 | Verify personal credentials of experts | |
| F00081 | Need way for end user to report operations | |
| F00092 | daylight | Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites). Anyone with datasets or data summaries can help with this |
| F00095 | Fact checking | Process suspicious artifacts, narratives, and incidents |