T0010 "Cultivate ignorant agents"

Tactic stage: TA15

Summary: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".


Has counters:

C00009 Educate high profile influencers on best practices
C00036 Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
C00046 Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
C00048 Name and Shame Influencers
C00051 Counter social engineering training
C00072 Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training
C00092 Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
C00093 Influencer code of conduct
C00111 Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
C00125 Prebunking
C00126 Social media amber alert
C00130 Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.
C00136 Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
C00156 Better tell your country or organization story
C00160 find and train influencers
C00162 Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
C00169 develop a creative content hub
C00174 Create a healthier news environment
C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
C00184 Media exposure
C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
C00190 open engagement with civil society
C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
C00212 build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant

Detection methods include:

F00004 Recruit like-minded converts "people who used to be in-group"
F00006 SWOT analysis of tech platforms
F00016 Identify fence-sitters
F00038 Social capital as attack vector


Examples include:

Seen in incidents: