TA01 "Plan Strategy"
Belongs to phase P01 Plan
Summary: Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.
| TA01 Tasks | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| TK0001 | Goal setting | Set the goals for this incident. |
| TK0002 | Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity) | Research intended audience. Includes audience segmentation, hot-button issues etc. |
| TK0003 | Campaign design (objective design) | Design the campaign(s) needed to meet the incident goals |
| TK0031 | OPSEC for TA01 | OPSEC for TA01 |
| TA01 Techniques | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| T0073 | Determine Target Audiences | Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artifacts intended to achieve the strategic ends. |
| T0074 | Determine Strategic Ends | Determining the campaigns goals or objectives. Examples include achieving achieving geopolitical advantage like undermining trust in an adversary, gaining domestic political advantage, achieving financial gain, or attaining a policy change, |
| TA01 Counters | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| C00006 | Charge for social media | Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. |
| C00008 | Create shared fact-checking database | Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups. |
| C00010 | Enhanced privacy regulation for social media | Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. |
| C00012 | Platform regulation | Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media |
| C00013 | Rating framework for news | This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items. |
| C00016 | Censorship | Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. |
| C00017 | Repair broken social connections | For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. |
| C00019 | Reduce effect of division-enablers | includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers |
| C00021 | Encourage in-person communication | Encourage offline communication |
| C00022 | Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety | Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks |
| C00024 | Promote healthy narratives | Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. |
| C00026 | Shore up democracy based messages | Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy |
| C00027 | Create culture of civility | This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. |
| C00073 | Inoculate populations through media literacy training | Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade. |
| C00096 | Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers | Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. |
| C00111 | Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views | |
| C00153 | Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure | Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate. |
| C00159 | Have a disinformation response plan | e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict. |
| C00161 | Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements | Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad. |
| C00170 | elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft | Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly. |
| C00174 | Create a healthier news environment | Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike. |
| C00176 | Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private | Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. |
| C00190 | open engagement with civil society | Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy. |
| C00205 | strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting | Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. |
| C00212 | build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant | Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education. |
| C00220 | Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan | Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. |
| C00221 | Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors | Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency |
| C00223 | Strengthen Trust in social media platforms | Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. |
| TA01 Detections | ||
| disarm_id | name | summary |
| F00001 | Analyse aborted / failed campaigns | Examine failed campaigns. How did they fail? Can we create useful activities that increase these failures? |
| F00002 | Analyse viral fizzle | We have no idea what this means. Is it something to do with the way a viral story spreads? |
| F00003 | Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors | |
| F00004 | Recruit like-minded converts "people who used to be in-group" | |
| F00005 | SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups | Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis of groups and audience segments. |
| F00006 | SWOT analysis of tech platforms | |
| F00090 | Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements | Bring private sector and civil society into accord on U.S. interests |
| F00091 | Partner to develop analytic methods & tools | This might include working with relevant technology firms to ensure that contracted analytic support is available. Contracted support is reportedly valuable because technology to monitor social media data is continually evolving, and such firms can provide the expertise to help identify and analyze trends, and they can more effectively stay abreast of the changing systems and develop new models as they are required |