Summary: Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. - Details

Summary: For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. - Details

Summary: includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers - Details

Summary: Encourage offline communication - Details

Summary: Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks - Details

Summary: Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. - Details

Summary: Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. - Details

Summary: Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy - Details

Summary: This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. - Details

Summary: Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate. - Details

Summary: Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. - Details

Summary: - Details

Summary: Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. - Details

Summary: Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency - Details

Summary: Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. - Details

Summary: Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education. - Details

Summary: Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. - Details

Summary: Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy. - Details

Summary: Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. - Details

Summary: Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike. - Details

Summary: Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly. - Details

Summary: Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad. - Details

Summary: Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. - Details

Summary: Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade. - Details

Summary: Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media - Details

Summary: This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items. - Details

Summary: Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups. - Details

Summary: e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict. - Details

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Summary: protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors - Details

Summary: Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. - Details

Summary: Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. - Details

Summary: Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective. T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy. Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform". - Details

Summary: international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects. - Details

Summary: Take legal action against for-profit "factories" creating misinformation. - Details

Summary: Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. - Details

Summary: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted. This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria. - Details

Summary: Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended - Details

Summary: Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. - Details

Summary: - Details

Summary: Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement. - Details

Summary: Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. - Details

Summary: Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. - Details

Summary: Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads” - Details

Summary: Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content. - Details

Summary: 1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. - Details

Summary: Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains - Details

Summary: Train local influencers in countering misinformation. - Details

Summary: Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns. Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors. - Details

Summary: Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time. Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters. - Details

Summary: Link to platform - Details

Summary: Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. - Details

Summary: Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. - Details

Summary: C00000 - Details

Summary: normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types. - Details

Summary: Make political discussion channels text-only. - Details

Summary: Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side” - Details

Summary: Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade - Details

Summary: Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" - Details

Summary: Also inoculation. - Details

Summary: Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003. - Details

Summary: Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. - Details

Summary: - Details

Summary: Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. - Details

Summary: Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. - Details

Summary: Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks - Details

Summary: includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs - Details

Summary: Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”. - Details

Summary: e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions - Details

Summary: Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. - Details

Summary: Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. - Details

Summary: Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. - Details

Summary: remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts. - Details

Summary: Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators. - Details

Summary: This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure. - Details

Summary: Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. - Details

Summary: Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts. - Details

Summary: Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc. - Details

Summary: Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. - Details

Summary: Label promote counter to disinformation - Details

Summary: debunk misinformation content. Provide link to facts. - Details

Summary: Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation - Details

Summary: Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms. - Details

Summary: Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation. - Details

Summary: Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags - Details

Summary: Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. - Details

Summary: Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. - Details

Summary: Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. - Details

Summary: highlight misinformation activities and actors in media - Details

Summary: Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their audience quality - Details

Summary: Stop passing on misinformation - Details

Summary: Debunk misinformation creators and posters. - Details

Summary: Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents. - Details

Summary: Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents. - Details

Summary: Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts. - Details

Summary: Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. - Details

Summary: fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism - Details

Summary: Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. - Details

Summary: FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. - Details

Summary: Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. - Details

Summary: - Details

Summary: Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. - Details

Summary: reduce the visibility of known botnets online. - Details

Summary: Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. - Details

Summary: Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. - Details

Summary: Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents - Details

Summary: File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. - Details

Summary: God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. - Details

Summary: Take botnet servers offline by seizing them. - Details

Summary: Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. - Details

Summary: Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics - Details

Summary: If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques. - Details

Summary: Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental. - Details

Summary: counters fake experts - Details

Summary: third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted. - Details

Summary: counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. - Details

Summary: Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal - Details

Summary: Encourage people to leave spcial media. We don't expect this to work - Details

Summary: remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. - Details

Summary: Detect and degrade - Details

Summary: Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts. - Details

Summary: Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year. - Details

Summary: Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. - Details

Summary: Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal - Details

Summary: Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. - Details

Summary: Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources. - Details

Summary: Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. - Details

Summary: Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators - Details

Summary: All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration. - Details

Summary: Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors. - Details

Summary: Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”. - Details

Summary: Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them. - Details

Summary: Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites - Details

Summary: Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation. - Details

Summary: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code. - Details

Summary: Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them. - Details

Summary: Merged two rows here. - Details

Summary: Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left. - Details

Summary: Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts. - Details

Summary: Counters fake account - Details